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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
'·I .I iT 11]' UTl\H' 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
LACll' WADE BARNEY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 18974 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of the offense of 
sale of a controlled substance, a second degree felony. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
A jury trial was held on November 23, 1982 in the 
Sixth District Court in and for Sevier County, Utah, and the 
appellant was convicted of the charged offense. On January 12, 1983, 
the appellant was sentenced to fifteen years in prison. The Court 
suspended the sentence and placed the appellant on probation on 
the condition he complete one year in jail in addition to other 
ordinary conditions of probation. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court's 
denial of his motion for a mistrial and a new trial. 
STATEMENT OP PACTS 
One Michael Reed Allred was visiting a bar known as 
Li'l Bits on November 7, 1981 when he was asked by some individu 0 J 
he did not know if he would buy some drugs for them IT-69-70). 
Allred responded he would check around for them and made ir1quiry 
of a Dave Jolley, a member of a band playing in the bar, if any 
drugs were available (T-70). Jolley responded affirmatively and 
told Allred he could have a gram of cocaine for $120.00 (T-72). 
Allred then got $120.00 from the unknown individuals. When the 
band took a break, Allred walked outside, walked up to the appellant, 
and asked him if he had drugs (T-73, 74). The appellant said yes 
and gave him a quantity of cocaine in return for the money, 
according to Allred (T-74). At least 16 people and perhaps as many 
as thirty were in the parking lot at the same time (T-84, 133). 
Allred took the substance into the bar and gave it to the strangers 
(T-75) . 
No doubt much to his chagrin, the men Allred gave the 
substance to turned out to be police officers (T-75). Eight months 
later he was permitted to plead guilty to a class A misdemeanor, 
two degrees less than a sales charge, (T-90), was fined (T-90), 
and in return for the first time gave the officers the name of 
the person from whom he allegedly purchased the drug (T-88) . 
As Allred himself put it, he "got a break" (T-91). The only 
evidence against the appellant was the word of Allred (T-103). 
The appellant's attorney in cross-examining Allred, 
asked him why he had not received a cue from Dave Jolley as to who 
was going to sell the drugs (T-84). Dave Jolley was the person 
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'.·iith wilnm all of the negotiations had occurred (T-70, 72). Allred 
n·spnnded, "Because I have got high with Mr. Barney before," (T-84) . 
nnn as the jury was excused the appellant moved for a mistrial, 
,,1,·r"Ji1FJ that the response was a volunteered reference to 
<L' 1udicial, unrelated misconduct (T-113). The motion was denied 
(T-115). 
The appellant called three witnesses who had been with 
him in the parking lot at the time in question. One gave the 
opinion that Allred was drunk (T-127, 128). Each said that no 
transaction took place between the appellant and Allred (T-125, 142, 
154). The appellant testified that at best he and Allred were 
acquaintances and he had not sold him anything (T-159, 161). 
ARGUMENT 
ALLRED'S STATEMENT VIOLATED RULE 55 OF THE 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
The State's own witnesses conceded that the only 
evidence against the appellant was Allred's uncorroborated claim 
that the cocaine he gave the undercover officers came from the 
appellant. The claim can only be viewed with great suspicion 
when it is considered in light of the circumstances in which it was 
first made. Given the meager, questionable evidence against the 
appellant, Allred's volunteered statement that he had gotten high 
with the appellant on other occasions was such a prejudicial 
violation of Rule 55, U. R. E., that a new trial is warranted. 
Before 1980, a conviction could not have been had on 
the uncorroborated word of Allred as a matter of law, (see then-
section 77-31-18, U. C. A. 1953). Present law would still require 
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Allred's claim that he acquired cocainC' frnm tllL' "l'i'''l Lrnt tn 
viewed with caution and close scr·utiny, ,,,,,·11nlf 71-17-7. 11,, 
was given money by total stran0ers Lind ("1)('.i111' fiq- m 
at their request. He was arrested and chn.rqc'd \v1tli a tr_-,l(JJl';..:. 
Eight months later he was offered a class /\ misdc>meanor and a fine, 
in contrast to the 15 years in prison and $10,000.00 fine he could 
have received, and all he had to do was produce a name and testify. 
It merely states the obvious to observe that the opportunity to 
avoid prison is a powerful motive to falsify. Coupled with the 
incentive to make a statement, any statement, even a false one, is 
the complete absence of any evidence to substantiate it. Not a 
single witness, including the undercover police officers, was 
called to testify that Allred and the appellant as much as spoke 
to one another inside the bar. Not a single witness from the 
sixteen to thirty people in the parking lot was called to testify 
that Allred and the appellant were even seen together. Those 
witnesses who did testify said that Allred was drunk, no transaction 
occurred, and Allred and the appellant hardly knew each other. It 
is against this backdrop of insubstantial evidence that the 
prejudicial impact of Allred's statement that he and the appellant 
had gotten high together must be gauged. 
Rule 55, U. R. E. provides in pertinent part that, 
evidence that a person committed a crime ... on a specified 
occasion, is inadmissable to prove his disposition to commit crime 
as the basis for an inference that he committed another crime 
State v. Forsyth, 641 P2d 1172 (Utah 1982) construed Rule 55 as a ru: 
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1, '',11w», providing that "other crime" evidence is admissable 
1 .. •.•1nt to lhe proof of some material fact. The volunteered 
•it from Allred that he had gotten high with the appellant 
n<>l rc•levant to any material fact. 
Allred was asked why he did not contact Dave Jolley 
dS to who had the drugs since all of his negotiations were with 
Jolley. He then made the getting high statement. The fact that 
one may or may not have "gotten high" in the past is no more 
relevant to the proof he sold drugs than it is logical to conclude 
that if one consumes groceries then one must be a grocer. However, 
the prejudicial impact of such a statement, particularly where the 
evidence is so weak, is readily apparent. A juror who has heard 
that an accused "gets high" on unspecified substances would be 
more inclined to convict on the sales charge despite the fact use 
may amount at worst to a minor misdemeanor while the sale is a 
serious felony. 
State v. Hansen, 588 P2d 164 (Utah 1978), demonstrates 
what must occur when other crime evidence is improperly placed 
before the jury. Hansen was a theft by receiving case in which the 
State presented evidence that stolen property had been received 
at times other than the one charged. The case was reversed and a 
11ew trial was granted. The appellant here should be granted the 
same relief, a new trial free from the prejudice engendered by 
Allred's statement. 
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CONCLUSION 
A new trial should be granted for tile reason,, "t,11,,,1 
DATED this day of October, 1983. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT VAN SC IVER 
EDWARD K. BRASS 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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